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Viewing cable 09MADRID833, COMBATTING VENEZUELAN DIVERSION OF ARMS TO THE FARC

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09MADRID833**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09MADRID833	2009-08-19 10:50	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Madrid

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.semana.com/nacion/wikileaks-venezuela-espana-rechazo-vinculacion-entre-chavez-farc/158873-3.aspx>

VZCZCXRO6073
RR RUEHLA
DE RUEHMD #0833 2311050
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191050Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1110
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5449
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 5352
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1377
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0964
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3097
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 4090

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000833

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NATE YOUNG, EUR/PRA; EUR/WE; WHA/AND.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2019

TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KBIO](#) [XT](#) [XM](#) [RS](#) [CO](#) [VE](#) [SW](#) [SP](#)

SUBJECT: COMBATTING VENEZUELAN DIVERSION OF ARMS TO THE FARC

REF: A. STATE 83014

[1](#)B. AUGUST 9 MORATINOS-S LETTER

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires William H. Duncan 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) Reftel points were conveyed August 14 to Spanish MFA Deputy Director General for Andean Affairs Javier Triana Jimenez (Triana served as Spanish Deputy Chief of Mission in Caracas from 2002 to 2006.). Triana said the Colombian government had asked FM Moratinos to raise with the GOV the diversion of anti-air missiles and Swedish-manufactured rocket launchers to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). He accepted as fact that arms seized by Colombian forces in July had come from Venezuela but was reluctant to concede the seizures demonstrated clear GOV support for the FARC. Triana said that "at his level" he was unaware of proven links and official participation. Triana said he could think of other possible (albeit "very improbable") explanations. He acknowledged evidence from the Reyes laptops pointed in that direction of GOV involvement. Nonetheless, he stressed the need for proof of high-level GOV complicity in arms transfers to the FARC. With regard to additional post-sale controls, Triana cautioned that short of "forcing an embargo," Europeans must analyze each potential sale carefully and acknowledge that neither the GOS nor the USG can control all arms exports to Venezuela. Triana asked rhetorically whether in restricting legitimate sales to Venezuela from countries that had post-shipment controls in place we did not risk even more limited accountability for transactions from less reliable partners.

12. (C) In response to the suggestion that Spain's upcoming January-June 2010 EU Presidency was an opportunity to raise awareness and strengthen controls, Triana expressed doubt about how much Spain could accomplish during its EU presidency and could not envision any specific additional measures Spain would institute beyond the existing protocols.

Although Triana's counterparts in the MFA arms control and Russia offices were unavailable during the August vacation period, Triana said he would share the points with other interested bureaus to ensure broad consideration of our views. While Triana discounted analysis directly linking the GOV with arms transfers to the FARC, he referenced FM Moratinos's travel to the region and subsequent August 9 letter (reftel B) as a demonstration of Spanish willingness to support the United States and Colombia. Post will continue to press our case that Spain should review current export controls to ensure sufficient transparency and accountability measures.

DUNCAN